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The picture of two contrasting man capture many headlines yesterday. My favourite picture is shown below where it shows the contrasting reaction from two opposing leaders. Maybe it is not the actual picture taken immediately after the court decision but certainly it demonstrate the feelings appropriately.
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While there are plenty of commentaries about the decision which I don’t want to dwell much into it as the reaction from the two camps are expected. Najib and the AG reactions are well scripted and executed. In my mind, there are 2 clear losers in this battle and it is not Nizar or Pakatan.
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The first loser would be the people of Perak. They have decided in the last GE who is to govern them and yesterday, the government that they chose was taken away from them the courts. Some may say that the 5 judges has acted in a fair manner but I guess for the people who understand the law, they can appreciate that the judges has not acted in a fair manner. No amount of legal argument can justify the decision made by the famous five.
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The people of Perak have lost their democracy. The country legislative body supposed to be a self regulating body but in the case of Perak, that is no longer the case. The self regulation of the Perak State Assembly has lost its independence. Nizar is quite right when he says the country is at the brink of absolute monarchy. The Sultan at his whims and fancies has elect and remove an MB when the law is quite clear that it cannot do so. The Sultan has not followed procedures. Because of this the democracy tree has felled in Perak. It is floating belly up in the centre of the Perak River.
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The second biggest loser would be the Perak Royalty and the system of Monarchy in Malaysia. In Perak, I foresee that people will begin to question the role and the need to have a Sultan. While the government don’t want to admit and it is not publicised in the MSM, it is certainly the talk in coffee shops. I hope I am not being labelled as criticising the Sultan but I believe that it is important for the Perak Royalty and the government to know the Rakyat pulse and do the right thing. Otherwise, we may lose the Royalty in the next 50 years.
- I suggest, the government do a serious rethinking on how to handle this matter. Oppressing the views is not the way to do it. I don’t think in the current times, the government has enough hands to close people mouth. Today in the hotel in Jakarta, I read the local Jakarta Post and many other international publications. Nothing good is being mentioned about Malaysia. Businessman will run away from Malaysia because they are suspicious on the courts impartiality. I call upon the government, please do a serious re-thinking.
And the losers are..
February 10, 2010 by Dr R@28
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CAN ANYONE PLEASE READ THE CASE OF STEPHEN KALONG NINGKAN AND TELL ME WHETHER ARE THERE ANY LOOPHOLES IN THE LAW THAT THIS CASE CANNOT BE UPHELD AND OVERRULED?
I CHALLENGE THE OBITER BEHIND THE OBITER OF THE LAW BEHIND THIS CASE.
I FIND THIS CASE HAS NO MERCY AT ALL FOR IT TO BE OVERRULED.
Dear Ottinger,
Not that many in this blog are well verse in Law…., but if possible….., you can carry your comments to a much higher level in this blog.
You will enlighten the rest no doubt. ( how’s things with you ..? )
Stare Decisis is a hallowed principle in the jurisprudential canon. It simply means that you respect the legal precedent established in analogous cases in the past.
The decision handed down today by the Federal Court in the case of whether Pakatan Rakyat’s Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin or Barisan Nasional’s Zambry Abd Kadir is the rightful menteri besar of Perak ignored the established precedents.
The precedents were set in the Stephen Kalong Ningkan case in Sarawak in 1966 and the Pairin Kitingan case in Sabah in 1985.
In both cases, the incumbent chief minister, Sarawak’s Ningkan in the first instance and Sabah’s Pairin in the latter, were either removed by ruler’s fiat or the appointment was challenged by a rival candidate for the post.
The Ningkan case established as a legal principle that once appointed, a chief minister could only be removed by a vote of no-confidence in the legislative assembly. The judge’s decision in the Pairin case upheld that principle.
In the Nizar vs Zambry case, High Court judge Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahim ruled last May in favour of Nizar as the rightful MB but first the Court of Appeal and now the Federal Court countermanded him.
Justice Abdul Aziz was respectful of the established precedent in the case. Doctrinal consistency is highly valued in jurisprudential theory.
In jurisprudential theory, established precedents can be overthrown only if unique facts enter the vortex of discursive imperatives in which a case is decided. There were no unique facts in the Nizar vs Zambry case.
Three state assemblypersons belonging to Nizar’s Pakatan Rakyat faction abruptly became independents, leaning towards support for the BN. Two of them were under indictment for corruption.
In the circumstances, the motives of the duo for becoming BN leaning independents could not be said to be above cavil.
The obvious resort, in conditions where there is an impasse in the legislative assembly brought on by legislators’ changed allegiance, influenced by unusual factors, would have been to that final arbiter of a polity’s distempers: the ballot box.
But no, the Court of Appeal, last May, and now the Federal Court have decided to ignore the principle of stare decisis and make the notion of judicial precedent a piece of chaff, drifting on every wind of circumstance.
It’s the kind of reasoning that makes you think that the law is an ass.
Ottinger,,
Absolutly correct,,,,.
What brought about the difference here is that,,,,
A) the resignation letter of the 3 frogs was not recognised.
B) The 3 frogs maintained that they were fully behind BN in Independant Capacity, thus giving them 31 seats.
The torn in the game was Sivakumar.
This was why the goalpost was made took a diffrent position and the courts decided to play BN’s game.
Rest is history.
alright, this is what is to be reproduced for our friends in cyberspace.
[1966]1 LNS 186
STEPHEN KALONG NINGKAN V. TUN ABANG HAJI OPENG AND TAWI SLI
FEDERAL COURT [KUCHING]
OCJ HARLEY A-G (BORNEO), CJ
[KUCHING CIVIL SUIT NO. K 45 OF 1966]
7 SEPTEMBER 1966
JUDGMENT
Harley A-G (Borneo) CJ:
The plaintiff was appointed Chief Minister of Sarawak on 22 July 1963. On 14 June 1966 there was a meeting of Council Negri at which, apart from the Speaker, plaintiff and twenty other members were present. Five members of the Sarawak United Peoples Party and one Machinda member, who normally behave as an opposition, were present among the total of 21 members. Of the 21 members, three were ex officio. Bills were. passed without opposition on that day. One of the members present, Abang Haji Abdulrahim bin Abang Haji Moasili, who gave evidence in this case, was a supporter of the plaintiff on 14 June and indeed up to 16 June. He says that as from the evening of 16 June he would not have supported the plaintiff. The fact remains that there has never been a motion of no confidence put in Council Negri, nor has there been any defeat of a Government bill.
On 14 June a letter was addressed from Kuala Lumpur to the Governor. It is accepted that this letter was signed by 21 persons who are members of Council Negri. (There are 42 members in all of Council Negri plus the Speaker.) The author of the letter was Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah, Federal Minister for Sarawak Affairs (not a member of Council Negri). The letter reads as follows:
Letter No. 1
“TOP SECRET
c/o YB Enche Thomas Kana,
Dewan Ra’ayat.
Kuala Lumpur.
14hb June 1966.
His Excellency,
The Governor of Sarawak,
The Astana,
KUCHING.
Your Excellency.
We, the undersigned members of Council Negri Sarawak, beg to inform your Excellency that we no longer have any confidence in the Hon Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan to be our leader in the Council Negri and to continue as Chief Minister.
2. Since the Hon. Dato’ Ningkan has mill to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Council Negri, he is bound by article 7(1) of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak to tender the resignation of the members of Supreme Council.
3. We respectfully request your Excellency to take appropriate action under that article and to appoint a new Chief Minister pursuant to article 6(3) of the Constitution.
Yours faithfully,
(Signed) T JUGAH.
(A list of names was attached.)
In the list attached to this letter, 25 names are set out. Against 21 of these names are signatures (in one case the signature is a “chop”). This letter was never shown to the plaintiff until after Court proceedings started. it was handed to the Governor (defendant 1) in Kuching on 16 June.
The next letter from the Governor’s private secretary to the plaintiff reads as follows:
LetterNo. 2
ASTANA,
KUCHING, SARAWAK.
Ref: GOV/SEC/144 16 June 1966.
To The Honourable Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan, PNBS PDK Chief Minister,
Sarawak.
Dato’,
I am directed by his Excellency to inform you that his Excellency has received representations from members of Council Negri constituting the majority of the council, informing his Excellency, and his Excellency is satisfies, that you have ceased to command their confidence.
2. In order that the provisions under articles 7(1) and 6(3) of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak be complied with, his Excellency requires your presence forthwith at the Istana upon receipt of this letter to tender your resignation.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) ABDUL KARIM BIN ABOL,
Ag Private Secretary to
HE the Governor.”
In answer to the above the plaintiff replied:
LetterNo. 3
Chief Minister,
Kuching,
Sarawak.
Malaysia.
17 June 1966.
Ref: CM 1/66
A-G Private Secretary to
His Excellency the Governor,
The Astana,
Kuching.
Sir,
GOV/SEC/144 dated 16 June 1966
I have the honour to refer to your above letter received by me late last evening and regret that I am temporarily indisposed and unable to present myself at the Astana last night.
With deepest respect, the proceedings of the meeting of the Council Negri held on 14 June 1966, do not appear to support his Excellency’s view that I have lost the confidence of the majority of it’s members. In these circumstances, I shall be grateful if I may be supplied with the names of those council members who support the representations referred to in your letter.
I shall be grateful if you will convey to his Excellency that, in my view, the proper course to resolve any doubts regarding my ability to command the confidence of the majority of Council Negri members is to arrange for the council to be convened in order that the matter can be put to the constitutional test.
In addition to believing that this represents both the democratic course and the best one for Sarawak and Malaysia, it is one which I believe would receive the support of the majority of the people of this State and one whose out-come I would be prepared to abide by.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) SK NINGKAN,
Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan,
Chief Minister of Sarawak.”
The vital letter comes next:
LetterNo. 4
ASTANA,
KUCHING, SARAWAK.
GOV/SEC/144 17 June 1966.
To
The Hon’ble Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan, PNBS, PDK Kuching, Sarawak.
Dear Dato’,
I have received your letter, Ref CM 1/66 dated 17 June 1966 in reply to my private secretary’s letter sent to your yesterday. It is clear from the contents of your letter that you have refused to tender the resignation of the members of the Supreme Council in accordance with art. 7(1) of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak, although you have ceased to have the confidence of a majority of the members of the Council Negri. I, therefore, declare that you and other members of the Supreme Council have ceased to hold the office with effect forthwith.
2. I am now appointing the Hon’ble Penghulu Tawi Sli. ABS Chief Minister of Sarawak with effect for with.
3. As requested, I forward herewith a list of the name of members of the Council Negri who have made representations to me in person that they have ceased to have confidence in you.
Yours sincerely.
Enc: (Signed) TUN ABANG HAJI OPENG
Governor.”
The Governor is the first defendant in the present suit and the Honourable Penghulu Tawi Sli is the second defendant. Mr. Kellock has made the point that it was only in this letter and after the dismissal that the names were provided and the names that were provided are a list of 21 names and are the same names that appear on the letter of 14 June.
Again on 17 June the plaintiff wrote:
LetterNo. 5
‘Pangau Libau’
Kuching.
17 June 1966.
His Excellency the Governor,
Tun Abang Haji Openg, SMN PNBS OBE
Astana,
Kuching.
Your Excellency,
I have received, with surprise, your letter (Ref: GOV/SEC/144) of today’s date.
It is not true that I have refused to tender my resignation – the question of tendering my resignation did not arise until after I received a reply to my letter requesting for the names of the members of the Council Negri.
It is clear from the list of the names forwarded to me that the majority of the Council Negri members are not against me, as 21 cannot be the majority of 42.
With the utmost respect I have to inform your Excellency that if you appoint the Hon’ble Pengulu Tawi Sli as Chief Minister you would be acting unlawfully and I will have no option but to question my removal in the Court.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) SK NINGKAN.
(Dato’ Stephen Ralong Ningkan)”.
On 17 June the Sarawak Government Gazette Extraordinary announced:
Document No. 6
No 117
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF SARAWAK
It is hereby published for general information that, with effect from 17 June 1966, the Honourable Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan, PNBS, PDK has ceased to be the Chief Minister of Sarawak and the following have ceased to be members of the Supreme Council:-
The Honourable Dato’ James Wong Kim Ming, PNBS
The Honourable Dato’ Abang Othman bin Abang Haji Moasili. PNBS
The Honourable Dato’ Dunstan Endawi anak Enchana, PNBS
Teo Kui Seng, PNBS
No 1118
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF SARAWAK
It is hereby published for general information that the Governor has, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by article 6(8) of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak, appointed by Instrument under the Public Seal dated 17 June 1966. the Honourable Penghulu Tawi Sli, ABS, to be the Chief Minister of Sarawak.”
The plaintiff claims:
1. A declaration of Court that the first defendant as Governor of Sarawak acted unconstitutionally by not complying with the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak when he declared on 17 June 1966, that the plaintiff has ceased to hold the office of Chief Minister of Sarawak.
2. A declaration of Court that the first defendant should not have relieved the plaintiff from the office of Chief Minister of Sarawak on the ground of representations made to him on 16 June 1966, by members of the Council Negri who preferred to boycott the session of the Council Negri on 14 June 1966, on the ground of alleged loss of confidence in the Chief Minister.
3. A declaration that his purported dismissal by the first defendant was ultra vires, null and void.
4. A declaration that the plaintiff is and has been at all material times Chief Minister of the State of Sarawak.
5. An injunction restraining the second defendant from acting as the Chief Minister of the State of Sarawak.
Respecting this claim, the following articles of the Constitution are relevant: article 1, (1) and (2); article 5; article 6 (1), (2) and (3) article 7 (1), (2) and (3); article 10 (1) and (2) article 11; article 13; article 14(1) (a) to (d) and (2) ; article 21 (1) and (2); article 24 (3); article 41 (1) and (2); article 44 (5).
I need not set out all these articles, but would draw particular attention to the following:
“Governor of the State
1. (1) There shall be a Governor of the State, who shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting in his discretion but after consultation with the Chief Minister.
(2) The Governor shall be appointed for & term of four years but may at any time resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, and may be removed from office by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in pursuance of an address by the Council Negri supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the members
“Executive authority
5. The executive authority of the State shall be vested in the Governor but executive functions may by law be conferred on other persons.”
“The Supreme Council
6. (1) There shall be a Supreme Council to advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions.
(2) The Supreme Council shall consist of a Chief Minister and not more than eight nor less than four other members appointed in accordance with cl (2).
(3) The Governor shall appoint an Chief Minister a member of the Council Negri who in his judgment in likely to command the confidence of a majority of the members of the Council Negri and shall appoint the other members in accordance with the advice of the Chief Minister from among the members of the Council Negri.
(6) The Supreme Council shall be collectively responsible to the council Negri.”
“Tenure of office of members of Supreme Council
7. (1) If the Chief Minister to command the confidence of a majority of the members of the Council Negri, then, unless at his request the Governor dissolves the Council Negri, the Chief Minister shall tender the resignation of the members of the Supreme Council.
(2) A member of the Supreme Council may at any time resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Governor, and a member of the Supreme Council other than the Chief Minister shall also vacate his office if his appointment thereto in revoked by the Governor acting in accordance with the advice of the Chief Minister.
(3) Subject to cll (1) and (2), a member of the Supreme Council other than the Chief Minister shall hold office at the Governor’s pleasure.”
“Governor to act on advise
10. (1) In the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or any other law, or as a member of the Conference of Rulers, the Governor shall act in accordance with the advice of the Supreme Council or of a member thereof acting under the general authority of the council, except as otherwise provided by the Federal Constitution or this Constitution; but shag be entitled, at his request, to any information concerning the government of the State which in available to the Supreme Council.
(2) The Governor may act in his discretion in the performance of the following functions- OPENG
(a) the appointment of a Chief Minister;
(b) the withholding of consent to a request for the dissolution of the Council Negri.”
“Procedure of Council Negri
24. (1)..
(2)..
(3) Subject to cll (5) and (6) and to cl (2) of article 41, the Council Negri shall, if not unanimous, take its decision by a simple majority of members voting; and the Speaker or member presiding shall cast a vote whenever necessary to avoid an equality of votes but shall not vote in any other case.”
“Interpretation
44. (1) ..
(2) ..
(3) ..
(4) ..
(5) The Interpretation Ordinance, as in force at the commencement of this Constitution, shall apply 2 for the purpose of interpreting this Constitution and otherwise in relation thereto as it applies for the purpose of interpreting and otherwise in relation to a written law within the meaning of that Ordinance.”
Section 21 of the Interpretation Ordinance (Cap. 1) reads as follows:- “Power to appoint includes power to dismiss
21. Whenever any written law confers upon any person or authority a power to make appointments to any office or place, the power shall be construed as including a power to dismiss or suspend any person appointed and to appoint another person temporarily in the place of any person so suspended, or in place of any sick or absent holder of such office or place:
Provided that, where the power of such person or authority to make such appointment is only exercisable upon the recommendation or subject to the approval or consent of some other person or authority, such power of dismissal shall only be exercisable upon the recommendation or subject to the approval or consent of such other person or authority.”
Section 2 (1) of the same Ordinance reads:-
Application
2. (1) Save where the contrary intention appears the provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to this Ordinance and to any written law now or hereafter in force made by competent authority in Sarawak and to any instrument made or issued thereunder.”
The following definition from the Interpretation Ordinance was not cited by Counsel on either side:
Governor in his discretion and ‘Governor acting in his discretion’ mean that, in respect of the power concerned, the Governor shall not be obliged to consult with the Supreme Council in the exercise thereof.”
The main arguments for the plaintiff are that (a) the Governor has no power of dismissal, and (b) if he has a power or a discretion it must not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
The defence contends that there Is no question of the Governor’s power being merely discretionary; in certain circumstances – particularly where there are infractions of the Constitution for which no sanction or remedy is provided – the Governor has not only a power but a duty to act. The defence further contends that lack of confidence describes a state of mind. (Article 7(1).
Whether a Chief Minister has or has not ceased to command the confidence of a majority is a matter for the Governor’s personal assessment. Moreover, “the rules for the construction of statutes are like those which apply to the construction of other documents, especially as regards one crucial rule, viz that, if it is possible, the words of a statute must be construed so as to give a sensible meaning to them. The words ought to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat.” MPHASIS v. Stovin [1889], 22 QBD 513 at p. 517). “If the Chief Minister ceases to command the confidence of a majority of the members of the Council Negri, then, unless at his request the Governor dissolves the Council Negri, the Chief Minister shall tender the resignation of the members of the Supreme Council.” (Article 7 (1) ). The first question which arises is how the lack of confidence is to be expressed: can such lack of confidence be assessed only by a vote on the floor of the House (if I may use this word in its general application) ? The Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria was of opinion that the constitutional method (in Nigeria) of measuring lack of confidence required a decision or resolution on the floor of the House. (Adegbenro v. Akintola [1963] 3 WLR 63 distinguished). The Privy Council took an opposite view and held that there was no limitation as to the material by which lack of confidence should be assessed. Does the same rule of construction apply in Sarawak as in Nigeria? I will not apologise for quoting at length from the case of Adegbenro v. Akintola, and I would draw attention at the start to the following passage (at p. 72): “…there are many good arguments to discourage a Governor from exercising his power of removal except upon indisputable evidence of actual voting in the House …. ” If one starts, as I think one should start, with the rule that a vote on the floor of the House is the normal test of lack of confidence, then one is in a better position to consider the exceptions to the rule. Now I cite from Adegbenro v. Akintola:
By s. 33 of the Constitution of Western Nigeria: ‘(10) …. the Ministers of the Government of the Region shall hold office during the Governor’s pleasure: Provided that – (a) the Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly; …. ‘
The Governor of the Western Region of Nigeria, following upon the receipt of a letter signed by 66 members of the House of Assembly – which was composed of 124 members – stating that they no longer supported the Premier, the present respondent, removed him from office and appointed the appellant in his place. There had been no vote adverse to the respondent in the House prior to his removal. Thereafter, in proceedings instituted by the respondent challenging the Governor’s right to remove him. the following issues were referred by the High Court of the Western Region to the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria Pursuant to s. 108 of the Constitution of the Federation: ‘(1) Can the Governor validly exercise power to remove the Premier from office under s. 33, subs (10), of the Constitution of Western Nigeria without prior decision or resolution on the floor of the House of Assembly showing that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the House? (2) Can the Governor validly exercise power to remove the Premier from office under s. 33(10) …. on the basis of any materials or information extraneous to the proceedings of the House of Assembly?’
The Federal Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, thus holding that the respondent had not been validly removed from office, and found it unnecessary to answer the second question. On appeal by the appellant …. Held (1)….(2) There was nothing either the scheme or provision of the Constitution of Western Nigeria which legally precluded the Governor from forming his opinion on the basis of anything but votes formally given on the door of the House. By the use of the words ‘it appears to him’ in s. 33(10) the Judgment as to the support enjoyed by a Premier was left to the Governor’s
own assessment and there was no limitation as to the material on which he might resort for the purpose. Accordingly, both the questions referred to the Federal Supreme Court should be answered in the affirmative.
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria reversed.”
The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Viscount Radcliffe:
…. The question to which an answer has to be found is of obvious importance, but it lies, nevertheless, within a very small compass. Its decision turns upon the meaning to be attached to the wording of s. 33(10) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria, read, an it should be, in the context of any other provisions of the Constitution that may legitimately influence its meaning.
It in clear, to begin with, that the Governor is invested with some power to dismiss the Premier. Logically, that power is a consequence of the enactment that Ministers shall hold office during the Governor’s pleasure, for, subject to the saving conditions of provisos (a) and (b) that follow, the Governor has only to withdraw his pleasure for a Minister’s tenure of office to be brought to an end. Where the Premier’s office in concerned it in so (a) that limits the Governors power to withdraw his pleasure constitutionally, for by that proviso he is precluded from removing the Premier from office ‘unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly.’ By these words therefore, the power of removal is at once recognised and conditioned: and, since the condition of constitutional action has been reduced to the formula of these words for the purpose of the written Constitution, it is their construction and nothing else that must determine the issue.
What, then, is the meaning of the words “the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the member”? It has been said, and said truly, that the phrase is derived from the constitutional understandings that support the unwritten, or rather partly unwritten, Constitution of the United Kingdom. It recognises the basic assumption of that Constitution, as it has been developed, that, so long ” the elected House of Representatives is in being, a majority of its members who are prepared to act to together with some cohesion is entitled to determine the effective leadership of the Government of the day. It recognises also one other principle that has come to be accepted in the United Kingdom: that, subject to questions as to the right of dissolution and appeal to the electorate, a Prime Minister ought not to remain office as such once it has been established that he has ceased to command the support of a majority of the House. But, when that is said, the practical application of these principles to a given situation if it arose in the United Kingdom, would depend less upon any simple statement of principle than upon the actual facts of that situation and the good sense and political sensitivity of the main actors called upon to take part.
It is said, too, that the ‘support’ that in to be considered is nothing else than support in the proceedings of the House itself, and with this proposition also their Lordships are in agreement. They do not think, however, that it is in itself a very pregnant observation. No doubt, everything comes back in the end to
the question what action the members of a party or a group or a combination are resolved to take in proceedings on the floor of the House; but in democratic politics speeches or writings outside the House, party meeting, speeches or activities inside the House short of actual voting are all capable of contributing evidence to indicate what action this or that member has decided to take when and if he is called upon to vote in the House, and it appears to their Lordships somewhat unreal to try to draw a firm dividing line between votes and other demonstrations where the issue of ‘support’ is concerned.
This, indeed, is the crux of the question that has now been raised. The respondent maintains, and it is implied in the decision that he has obtained from the Federal Supreme Court, that the Governor cannot constitutionally take account of anything in the matter of ‘support’ except the record of votes actually given on the floor of the House. Consequently, it is said, his action in removing the first respondent from the Premiership on the strength, it appears, of the letter address to him by the 66 members of the House referred to and without waiting until there had been an adverse vote in the House itself was not within the powers conferred upon him by the Constitution.
The difficulty of limiting the statutory power of the Governor in this way is that the limitation is not to be found in the words in which the makers of the Constitution have decided to record their description of his powers. By the words they have employed in their formula, ‘it appears to him’, the judgment as to the support enjoyed by a Premier is left to the Governors own assessment and there is no limitation as to the material on which he is to base his judgment or the contacts to which he may resort for the purpose. There would have been no difficulty at all in so limiting him if it had been intended to do no. For instance, he might have been given power to act only after the passing of a resolution of the House ‘that it has no confidence in the Government of the Region’, the very phrase employed in an adjoining section of the Constitution (see s. 31 (4), proviso (b) ) to delimit the Governor’s power of dissolving the House even without the Premier’s advice. According to any ordinary rule of construction weight must be given to the fact that the Governor’s power of removal is not limited in such precise terms as would confine his judgment to the actual proceedings of the House, unless there are compulsive reasons, to be found in the context of the Constitution or to be deduced from obvious general principles, that would impose the more limited meaning for which the respondent contends.
Their Lordships have not discovered any such reasons. It is one thing to point out the dangers of a Governor arriving at any conclusion “to his Premier”s support in the House except upon the incontrovertible evidence of votes recorded there on some crucial issue. There are indeed such danger Expressions of opinion, attitude or intention upon such a delicate matter may well prove to be delusive. He may Judge the situation wrongly and so find himself to have taken a critical step in a direction which is proved to be contrary to the wishes of the majority of the House or of the electorate. Again, if he is not to rely an his Premier for advice as to the balance of support in the House, he is likely to And that he is in effect consulting indirectly the views of opposition leaders who may turn out
in the event to be no more than an opposition: or he will find himself backing the political judgments conveyed to him by his own private advisers against the political judgment of the Premier himself
All these are real dangers which any Governor proposing to act under his power of removal would need to bear in mind, since, if he ignores them, he would run the risk of placing the constitutional sovereign power, whose representative he in, in conflict with the will of the elected House of Representatives whose majority is for the time being expressed in the person of the Premier. Anyone familiar with the constitutional history and development of the United Kingdom would naturally dwell upon these aspects of the Sovereign’s position, if he was invited to advise a Governor as to the circumstances and occasions upon which he could wisely exercise his power of removal.
But, while there may be formidable arguments in favour of the Governor confining his conclusion on such a point to the recorded voting in the House, if the impartiality of the constitutional sovereign in not to be in danger of compromise, the arguments are considerations of policy and propriety which it in for him to weigh on each particular occasion: they are not legal restrictions which a Court of law, interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution, can import into the written document and make it his legal duty to observe. To sum up, there are many food arguments to discourage a Governor from exercising his power of removal except upon indisputable evidence of actual voting in the House, but it is nonetheless impossible to say that situations cannot arise in which these arguments are outweighed by considerations which afford-to the Governor the evidence he is to look for, even without the testimony of recorded votes.
Another argument has been advanced to the effect that the Nigerian Constitutions are modelled on the current constitutional doctrines of the United Kingdom, and, since the British Sovereign would not be regarded as acting with constitutional propriety in dismissing a Prime Minister from office without the foundation of an adverse vote on a major issue in the House of Commons, so the Governor in Western Nigeria must similarly be treated as precluded from exercising his power of removal in the absence of a vote of the awe kind. This approach to the matter appears to their Lordships to have had some influence upon the view taken by the majority of the Federal Supreme Court in this case, and, since it seems capable of conveying an implication that could be misleading in other situations apart from the present one, their Lordships wish to make two observations upon it.
The first is that British constitutional history does not offer any but a general negative guide as to the circumstances in which a Sovereign can dismiss a Prime Minister. Since the principles which are accepted today began to take shape with the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832 no British Sovereign has in fact dismissed or removed a Prime Minister, even allowing for the ambiguous exchanges which took place between William IV and Lord Melbourne in 1834. Discussion of constitutional doctrine bearing upon a Prime Minister’s loss of support in the House of Commons concentrates therefore upon a Prime Minister’s duty to ask for liberty to resign or for a dissolution, rather than upon the Sovereign’s right of removal, an exercise of which is not treated as being within the scope of
practical politics. In this state of affairs it is vain to look to British precedent for guidance upon the circumstances in which or the evidential material upon which a Prime Minister can be dismissed, where dismissal is an actual possibility: and the right or removal which is explicitly recognised in the Nigerian Constitutions must be interpreted according to the wording of its own limitations and not to limitations which that wording does not import.
. … it is in the end the wording of the Constitution itself that is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording can never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions which are not explicitly incorporated in the formulae that have been chosen as the frame of this Constitution.”
In my view the Privy Council’s judgment relating to the Constitution of Nigeria does not apply to the Constitution of Sarawak because of the following distinguishing features and circumstances:
(1) In the Nigerian case it was mathematically beyond question that more than half the House no longer supported the Premier.
(2) The measurement in Nigeria was a measurement of “support”, not of “confidence”. The Sarawak Constitution is dated subsequent to the decision of Adegbenro v. Akintola, and it does seem to me that the “confidence” of a majority of members, being a term of art, may imply reference to a vote such as a vote of confidence or a vote on a major issue.
(3) In Nigeria it was not disputed that the Governor had express power to remove the Premier from office if he no longer commanded support.
(4) In Nigeria the Governor had express power to assess the situation “as it appeared to him”.
(5) In Nigeria all Ministers, including the Premier, held office “during the Governor’s pleasure”; although there was an important proviso to this.
All the above five points were peculiar to Nigeria, and not one of them applies to Sarawak. These distinguishing features force me in the present case to a conclusion converse to the Privy Council decision. It seems to me that by the provisions of the Sarawak Constitution, lack of confidence may be demonstrated only by a vote in Council Negri. Men who put their names to a “Top Secret” letter may well hesitate to vote publicly in support of their private views.
The third of the five points listed above obviously requires further consideration. Has the Governor in Sarawak power at all to dismiss the Chief Minister? In considering this question, we may start with s. 21 of the Interpretation Ordinance, the general effect of which is that where there is power to appoint (and it is not disputed that the Governor has power to appoint a Chief Minister) there is power to dismiss. However, where the appointment is “subject to the approval …. of some other person the power of dismissal shall only be exercisable…. subject to the approval….of such other person.” If the appointment of a Chief Minister is subject to the approval of Council Negri, then by this s. 21 dismissal also would be subject to its approval. Further, in principle, Council Negri should manage its own affairs. A Governor is limited by article 6(3) of the Constitution to appointing as Chief Minister a member of Council Negri who in his judgment is likely to command its confidence (and approval) : thereafter it follows, by s. 21 of the Interpretation Ordinance, that only when Council Negri has shown lack of confidence (and lack of approval), can the Governor’s power to dismiss, if it exists, be exercised.
Of course, if the Sarawak Constitution lays down that a Chief Minister may not be dismissed at all, then the defendants have no case and the Interpretation Ordinance cannot apply. The Sarawak Constitution does in fact direct in article 7(3) that all Ministers other than the Chief Minister hold office at the Governor’s pleasure. According to Mr. Le Quesne this means that Ministers other than the Chief Minister may be dismissed “at the Governor’s pleasure”, whereas the Chief Minister may only be dismissed for cause. If the cause for dismissal is limited to the case of an adverse vote, then this interpretation does not help defendants. In my view, however, the suggested interpretation is altogether false. Article 7(3) clearly means that the Governor may dismiss Ministers but may not dismiss the Chief Minister in any circumstances.
A lot has been said about the duty and powers and discretion of the Governor. His paramount duty is to “act in accordance with the advice of the Supreme Council or of a member thereof acting under the general authority of the Council”. (Article 10(1). There are two occasions when the Governor has a discretion, that is, when he can act without, or even contrary to, the advice of the Supreme Council. Those occasions are in the performance of the following functions –
(a) the appointment of a Chief Minister;
(b) the withholding of consent to a request for the dissolution of the Council Negri. (Article 10 (2) ).
As regards (a), nobody could be so foolish as to suggest that a Governor could appoint a second Chief Minister while there was still one in office. As regards (b), this probably has in mind a situation of splinter parties, as has been the case in France, when a general election could not be expected to show an overall majority for any one party. In Sarawak, it seems to me that a Chief Minister may advise a dissolution, even though he has not as yet lost the confidence of Council Negri. In such circumstances, the Governor’s refusal to dissolve might be conventionally unconstitutional, although not illegal.
To revert to the comparison of the Constitutions of Sarawak and of Nigeria, these Constitutions are so different that a contrast in powers must be intended: in Sarawak the Chief Minister’s dismissal is quite simply beyond the powers of the Governor.
If the Constitution, however, should be construed as giving to the Governor a power to dismiss, that power can only be exercised – and I think that this was conceded by Mr. Le Quesne – when both
(a) the Chief Minister has lost the confidence of the House, and
(b) the Chief Minister has refused to resign and failed to advise a dissolution.
I have already dealt with (a) ; as regards (b), I do not think that the Chief Minister of Sarawak was ever given a reasonable opportunity to tender his resignation or to request a dissolution. He was never even shown the letter on which the dismissal was based until Court proceedings started, although it is true that at the moment of dismissal a list of signatories was sent to him with the letter from the Governor dated 17 June that list and that letter were typed on the same date as the publication in the Gazette of the dismissal of the plaintiff, who was given no time at all to consider the weight or effect of the move against him. Plaintiff did not refuse to resign: he merely expressed doubts whether in fact he had ceased to command a majority and requested “that the matter be put to the constitutional test”.
A word may be said on what is the position if a Chief Minister has in fact ceased to command the confidence of a majority, and yet refuses to resign. In this situation at least, Mr. Le Quesne claims that the Governor must have a right of dismissal; otherwise the Constitution would be unworkable. Mr. Le Quesne’s argument in effect is: if there is a gap, it must be filled: if there is no express power to enforce the resignation of a Chief Minister, that power must by implication lie with the Governor. I do not agree that stopgaps can be, as it were, improvised. In article 1 of the Constitution, a gap would appear to exist whenever the necessary address to remove the Governor is made to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, and the latter’y refuses to dismiss him. Just because a Chief Minister or a Governor does not go when he ought to go is not sufficient reason for implying in the Constitution an enforcing power vested in some individual. R is, however, reasonable that in certain situations the Courts could expound the Constitution by declaratory judgments. Articles or clauses to cover all situations need not be set out in a Constitution because the residue of discretionary power is left in the Courts. Extraordinary situations do not often arise, and need not be met or considered until they do. Dicey has a whole chapter on “The Sanction by which the Conventions of the Constitution are enforced”. (Chapter XV: The law of the Constitution: AV Dicey (10th Edn.) pp 444 to 457.)
….the nation expects that a Minister who cannot retain the confidence of the House of Commons, shall give up his place, and no Premier even dreams of disappointing these expectations.” (at p. 444)
But the sanction which constrains the boldest political adventurer to obey the fundamental principles of the constitution and the conventions in which these principles are expressed, is the fact that the breach of principles and of these conventions will almost immediately bring the offender into conflict with the Courts and the law of the land.” (at p. 445)
. .. the one essential principle of the constitution is obedience by all persons to the deliberately expressed will of the House of Commons in the first instance, and ultimately to the will of the nation as expressed through Parliament.” (at p. 456)
Of course, therefore, a Minister or a Ministry must resign if the House passes a vote of want of confidence.”
(at p. 457)
Dicey is speaking of the British Constitution, but the same principles apply mutatis mutandis to the Constitution of Sarawak. The constitutional way out both for a British Prime Minister and for a Sarawak Chief Minister is not by dismissal but by resignation. We need not speculate on what would happen if occasion arose for a resignation, and a Chief Minister refused to resign. ‘In the instant case, the Chief Minister has not refused to resign, and there is no power to dismiss him. He has already indicated through his Counsel that he was prepared to consider a dissolution and presently an election. That political solution may well be the only way to avoid a multiplicity of legal complications. Possibly all parties, and the people of this nation, in whom sovereignty is supposed to lie, will wish the same solution.
In some political situations a judicial duty to rule upon the legal merits of the case may have to be accepted as an inescapable obligation …. In an atmosphere highly charged with political tension the task of the Judges may be acutely embarrassing, especially if they are called upon to decide between two claimants to legitimate political power, of whom one commands the effective means of imposing his will and the other is able to marshal equally or more persuasive legal arguments.”
(“The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions”:
SA de Smith, p. 87)
Embarrassing as it may be, my task is simply to interpret the written word of the Constitution. On such interpretation the case presented in the statement of claim is unchallengeable. There will be judgment for the plaintiff as prayed.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
[1966]1 LNS 186
STEPHEN KALONG NINGKAN V. TUN ABANG HAJI OPENG AND TAWI SLI
FEDERAL COURT [KUCHING]
OCJ HARLEY A-G (BORNEO), CJ
[KUCHING CIVIL SUIT NO. K 45 OF 1966]
7 SEPTEMBER 1966
JUDGMENT
Harley A-G (Borneo) CJ:
The plaintiff was appointed Chief Minister of Sarawak on 22 July 1963. On 14 June 1966 there was a meeting of Council Negri at which, apart from the Speaker, plaintiff and twenty other members were present. Five members of the Sarawak United Peoples Party and one Machinda member, who normally behave as an opposition, were present among the total of 21 members. Of the 21 members, three were ex officio. Bills were. passed without opposition on that day. One of the members present, Abang Haji Abdulrahim bin Abang Haji Moasili, who gave evidence in this case, was a supporter of the plaintiff on 14 June and indeed up to 16 June. He says that as from the evening of 16 June he would not have supported the plaintiff. The fact remains that there has never been a motion of no confidence put in Council Negri, nor has there been any defeat of a Government bill.
On 14 June a letter was addressed from Kuala Lumpur to the Governor. It is accepted that this letter was signed by 21 persons who are members of Council Negri. (There are 42 members in all of Council Negri plus the Speaker.) The author of the letter was Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah, Federal Minister for Sarawak Affairs (not a member of Council Negri). The letter reads as follows:
Letter No. 1
“TOP SECRET
c/o YB Enche Thomas Kana,
Dewan Ra’ayat.
Kuala Lumpur.
14hb June 1966.
His Excellency,
The Governor of Sarawak,
The Astana,
KUCHING.
Your Excellency.
We, the undersigned members of Council Negri Sarawak, beg to inform your Excellency that we no longer have any confidence in the Hon Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan to be our leader in the Council Negri and to continue as Chief Minister.
2. Since the Hon. Dato’ Ningkan has mill to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Council Negri, he is bound by article 7(1) of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak to tender the resignation of the members of Supreme Council.
3. We respectfully request your Excellency to take appropriate action under that article and to appoint a new Chief Minister pursuant to article 6(3) of the Constitution.
Yours faithfully,
(Signed) T JUGAH.
(A list of names was attached.)
In the list attached to this letter, 25 names are set out. Against 21 of these names are signatures (in one case the signature is a “chop”). This letter was never shown to the plaintiff until after Court proceedings started. it was handed to the Governor (defendant 1) in Kuching on 16 June.
The next letter from the Governor’s private secretary to the plaintiff reads as follows:
LetterNo. 2
ASTANA,
KUCHING, SARAWAK.
Ref: GOV/SEC/144 16 June 1966.
To The Honourable Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan, PNBS PDK Chief Minister,
Sarawak.
Dato’,
I am directed by his Excellency to inform you that his Excellency has received representations from members of Council Negri constituting the majority of the council, informing his Excellency, and his Excellency is satisfies, that you have ceased to command their confidence.
2. In order that the provisions under articles 7(1) and 6(3) of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak be complied with, his Excellency requires your presence forthwith at the Istana upon receipt of this letter to tender your resignation.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) ABDUL KARIM BIN ABOL,
Ag Private Secretary to
HE the Governor.”
In answer to the above the plaintiff replied:
LetterNo. 3
Chief Minister,
Kuching,
Sarawak.
Malaysia.
17 June 1966.
Ref: CM 1/66
A-G Private Secretary to
His Excellency the Governor,
The Astana,
Kuching.
Sir,
GOV/SEC/144 dated 16 June 1966
I have the honour to refer to your above letter received by me late last evening and regret that I am temporarily indisposed and unable to present myself at the Astana last night.
With deepest respect, the proceedings of the meeting of the Council Negri held on 14 June 1966, do not appear to support his Excellency’s view that I have lost the confidence of the majority of it’s members. In these circumstances, I shall be grateful if I may be supplied with the names of those council members who support the representations referred to in your letter.
I shall be grateful if you will convey to his Excellency that, in my view, the proper course to resolve any doubts regarding my ability to command the confidence of the majority of Council Negri members is to arrange for the council to be convened in order that the matter can be put to the constitutional test.
In addition to believing that this represents both the democratic course and the best one for Sarawak and Malaysia, it is one which I believe would receive the support of the majority of the people of this State and one whose out-come I would be prepared to abide by.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) SK NINGKAN,
Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan,
Chief Minister of Sarawak.”
The vital letter comes next:
LetterNo. 4
ASTANA,
KUCHING, SARAWAK.
GOV/SEC/144 17 June 1966.
To
The Hon’ble Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan, PNBS, PDK Kuching, Sarawak.
Dear Dato’,
I have received your letter, Ref CM 1/66 dated 17 June 1966 in reply to my private secretary’s letter sent to your yesterday. It is clear from the contents of your letter that you have refused to tender the resignation of the members of the Supreme Council in accordance with art. 7(1) of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak, although you have ceased to have the confidence of a majority of the members of the Council Negri. I, therefore, declare that you and other members of the Supreme Council have ceased to hold the office with effect forthwith.
2. I am now appointing the Hon’ble Penghulu Tawi Sli. ABS Chief Minister of Sarawak with effect for with.
3. As requested, I forward herewith a list of the name of members of the Council Negri who have made representations to me in person that they have ceased to have confidence in you.
Yours sincerely.
Enc: (Signed) TUN ABANG HAJI OPENG
Governor.”
The Governor is the first defendant in the present suit and the Honourable Penghulu Tawi Sli is the second defendant. Mr. Kellock has made the point that it was only in this letter and after the dismissal that the names were provided and the names that were provided are a list of 21 names and are the same names that appear on the letter of 14 June.
Again on 17 June the plaintiff wrote:
LetterNo. 5
‘Pangau Libau’
Kuching.
17 June 1966.
His Excellency the Governor,
Tun Abang Haji Openg, SMN PNBS OBE
Astana,
Kuching.
Your Excellency,
I have received, with surprise, your letter (Ref: GOV/SEC/144) of today’s date.
It is not true that I have refused to tender my resignation – the question of tendering my resignation did not arise until after I received a reply to my letter requesting for the names of the members of the Council Negri.
It is clear from the list of the names forwarded to me that the majority of the Council Negri members are not against me, as 21 cannot be the majority of 42.
With the utmost respect I have to inform your Excellency that if you appoint the Hon’ble Pengulu Tawi Sli as Chief Minister you would be acting unlawfully and I will have no option but to question my removal in the Court.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) SK NINGKAN.
(Dato’ Stephen Ralong Ningkan)”.
On 17 June the Sarawak Government Gazette Extraordinary announced:
Document No. 6
No 117
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF SARAWAK
It is hereby published for general information that, with effect from 17 June 1966, the Honourable Dato’ Stephen Kalong Ningkan, PNBS, PDK has ceased to be the Chief Minister of Sarawak and the following have ceased to be members of the Supreme Council:-
The Honourable Dato’ James Wong Kim Ming, PNBS
The Honourable Dato’ Abang Othman bin Abang Haji Moasili. PNBS
The Honourable Dato’ Dunstan Endawi anak Enchana, PNBS
Teo Kui Seng, PNBS
No 1118
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF SARAWAK
It is hereby published for general information that the Governor has, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by article 6(8) of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak, appointed by Instrument under the Public Seal dated 17 June 1966. the Honourable Penghulu Tawi Sli, ABS, to be the Chief Minister of Sarawak.”
The plaintiff claims:
1. A declaration of Court that the first defendant as Governor of Sarawak acted unconstitutionally by not complying with the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Sarawak when he declared on 17 June 1966, that the plaintiff has ceased to hold the office of Chief Minister of Sarawak.
2. A declaration of Court that the first defendant should not have relieved the plaintiff from the office of Chief Minister of Sarawak on the ground of representations made to him on 16 June 1966, by members of the Council Negri who preferred to boycott the session of the Council Negri on 14 June 1966, on the ground of alleged loss of confidence in the Chief Minister.
3. A declaration that his purported dismissal by the first defendant was ultra vires, null and void.
4. A declaration that the plaintiff is and has been at all material times Chief Minister of the State of Sarawak.
5. An injunction restraining the second defendant from acting as the Chief Minister of the State of Sarawak.
Respecting this claim, the following articles of the Constitution are relevant: article 1, (1) and (2); article 5; article 6 (1), (2) and (3) article 7 (1), (2) and (3); article 10 (1) and (2) article 11; article 13; article 14(1) (a) to (d) and (2) ; article 21 (1) and (2); article 24 (3); article 41 (1) and (2); article 44 (5).
I need not set out all these articles, but would draw particular attention to the following:
“Governor of the State
1. (1) There shall be a Governor of the State, who shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting in his discretion but after consultation with the Chief Minister.
(2) The Governor shall be appointed for & term of four years but may at any time resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, and may be removed from office by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in pursuance of an address by the Council Negri supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the members
“Executive authority
5. The executive authority of the State shall be vested in the Governor but executive functions may by law be conferred on other persons.”
“The Supreme Council
6. (1) There shall be a Supreme Council to advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions.
(2) The Supreme Council shall consist of a Chief Minister and not more than eight nor less than four other members appointed in accordance with cl (2).
(3) The Governor shall appoint an Chief Minister a member of the Council Negri who in his judgment in likely to command the confidence of a majority of the members of the Council Negri and shall appoint the other members in accordance with the advice of the Chief Minister from among the members of the Council Negri.
(6) The Supreme Council shall be collectively responsible to the council Negri.”
“Tenure of office of members of Supreme Council
7. (1) If the Chief Minister to command the confidence of a majority of the members of the Council Negri, then, unless at his request the Governor dissolves the Council Negri, the Chief Minister shall tender the resignation of the members of the Supreme Council.
(2) A member of the Supreme Council may at any time resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Governor, and a member of the Supreme Council other than the Chief Minister shall also vacate his office if his appointment thereto in revoked by the Governor acting in accordance with the advice of the Chief Minister.
(3) Subject to cll (1) and (2), a member of the Supreme Council other than the Chief Minister shall hold office at the Governor’s pleasure.”
“Governor to act on advise
10. (1) In the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or any other law, or as a member of the Conference of Rulers, the Governor shall act in accordance with the advice of the Supreme Council or of a member thereof acting under the general authority of the council, except as otherwise provided by the Federal Constitution or this Constitution; but shag be entitled, at his request, to any information concerning the government of the State which in available to the Supreme Council.
(2) The Governor may act in his discretion in the performance of the following functions- OPENG
(a) the appointment of a Chief Minister;
(b) the withholding of consent to a request for the dissolution of the Council Negri.”
“Procedure of Council Negri
24. (1)..
(2)..
(3) Subject to cll (5) and (6) and to cl (2) of article 41, the Council Negri shall, if not unanimous, take its decision by a simple majority of members voting; and the Speaker or member presiding shall cast a vote whenever necessary to avoid an equality of votes but shall not vote in any other case.”
“Interpretation
44. (1) ..
(2) ..
(3) ..
(4) ..
(5) The Interpretation Ordinance, as in force at the commencement of this Constitution, shall apply 2 for the purpose of interpreting this Constitution and otherwise in relation thereto as it applies for the purpose of interpreting and otherwise in relation to a written law within the meaning of that Ordinance.”
Section 21 of the Interpretation Ordinance (Cap. 1) reads as follows:- “Power to appoint includes power to dismiss
21. Whenever any written law confers upon any person or authority a power to make appointments to any office or place, the power shall be construed as including a power to dismiss or suspend any person appointed and to appoint another person temporarily in the place of any person so suspended, or in place of any sick or absent holder of such office or place:
Provided that, where the power of such person or authority to make such appointment is only exercisable upon the recommendation or subject to the approval or consent of some other person or authority, such power of dismissal shall only be exercisable upon the recommendation or subject to the approval or consent of such other person or authority.”
Section 2 (1) of the same Ordinance reads:-
Application
2. (1) Save where the contrary intention appears the provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to this Ordinance and to any written law now or hereafter in force made by competent authority in Sarawak and to any instrument made or issued thereunder.”
The following definition from the Interpretation Ordinance was not cited by Counsel on either side:
Governor in his discretion and ‘Governor acting in his discretion’ mean that, in respect of the power concerned, the Governor shall not be obliged to consult with the Supreme Council in the exercise thereof.”
The main arguments for the plaintiff are that (a) the Governor has no power of dismissal, and (b) if he has a power or a discretion it must not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
The defence contends that there Is no question of the Governor’s power being merely discretionary; in certain circumstances – particularly where there are infractions of the Constitution for which no sanction or remedy is provided – the Governor has not only a power but a duty to act. The defence further contends that lack of confidence describes a state of mind. (Article 7(1).
Whether a Chief Minister has or has not ceased to command the confidence of a majority is a matter for the Governor’s personal assessment. Moreover, “the rules for the construction of statutes are like those which apply to the construction of other documents, especially as regards one crucial rule, viz that, if it is possible, the words of a statute must be construed so as to give a sensible meaning to them. The words ought to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat.” MPHASIS v. Stovin [1889], 22 QBD 513 at p. 517). “If the Chief Minister ceases to command the confidence of a majority of the members of the Council Negri, then, unless at his request the Governor dissolves the Council Negri, the Chief Minister shall tender the resignation of the members of the Supreme Council.” (Article 7 (1) ). The first question which arises is how the lack of confidence is to be expressed: can such lack of confidence be assessed only by a vote on the floor of the House (if I may use this word in its general application) ? The Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria was of opinion that the constitutional method (in Nigeria) of measuring lack of confidence required a decision or resolution on the floor of the House. (Adegbenro v. Akintola [1963] 3 WLR 63 distinguished). The Privy Council took an opposite view and held that there was no limitation as to the material by which lack of confidence should be assessed. Does the same rule of construction apply in Sarawak as in Nigeria? I will not apologise for quoting at length from the case of Adegbenro v. Akintola, and I would draw attention at the start to the following passage (at p. 72): “…there are many good arguments to discourage a Governor from exercising his power of removal except upon indisputable evidence of actual voting in the House …. ” If one starts, as I think one should start, with the rule that a vote on the floor of the House is the normal test of lack of confidence, then one is in a better position to consider the exceptions to the rule. Now I cite from Adegbenro v. Akintola:
By s. 33 of the Constitution of Western Nigeria: ‘(10) …. the Ministers of the Government of the Region shall hold office during the Governor’s pleasure: Provided that – (a) the Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly; …. ‘
The Governor of the Western Region of Nigeria, following upon the receipt of a letter signed by 66 members of the House of Assembly – which was composed of 124 members – stating that they no longer supported the Premier, the present respondent, removed him from office and appointed the appellant in his place. There had been no vote adverse to the respondent in the House prior to his removal. Thereafter, in proceedings instituted by the respondent challenging the Governor’s right to remove him. the following issues were referred by the High Court of the Western Region to the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria Pursuant to s. 108 of the Constitution of the Federation: ‘(1) Can the Governor validly exercise power to remove the Premier from office under s. 33, subs (10), of the Constitution of Western Nigeria without prior decision or resolution on the floor of the House of Assembly showing that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the House? (2) Can the Governor validly exercise power to remove the Premier from office under s. 33(10) …. on the basis of any materials or information extraneous to the proceedings of the House of Assembly?’
The Federal Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, thus holding that the respondent had not been validly removed from office, and found it unnecessary to answer the second question. On appeal by the appellant …. Held (1)….(2) There was nothing either the scheme or provision of the Constitution of Western Nigeria which legally precluded the Governor from forming his opinion on the basis of anything but votes formally given on the door of the House. By the use of the words ‘it appears to him’ in s. 33(10) the Judgment as to the support enjoyed by a Premier was left to the Governor’s
own assessment and there was no limitation as to the material on which he might resort for the purpose. Accordingly, both the questions referred to the Federal Supreme Court should be answered in the affirmative.
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria reversed.”
The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Viscount Radcliffe:
…. The question to which an answer has to be found is of obvious importance, but it lies, nevertheless, within a very small compass. Its decision turns upon the meaning to be attached to the wording of s. 33(10) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria, read, an it should be, in the context of any other provisions of the Constitution that may legitimately influence its meaning.
It in clear, to begin with, that the Governor is invested with some power to dismiss the Premier. Logically, that power is a consequence of the enactment that Ministers shall hold office during the Governor’s pleasure, for, subject to the saving conditions of provisos (a) and (b) that follow, the Governor has only to withdraw his pleasure for a Minister’s tenure of office to be brought to an end. Where the Premier’s office in concerned it in so (a) that limits the Governors power to withdraw his pleasure constitutionally, for by that proviso he is precluded from removing the Premier from office ‘unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly.’ By these words therefore, the power of removal is at once recognised and conditioned: and, since the condition of constitutional action has been reduced to the formula of these words for the purpose of the written Constitution, it is their construction and nothing else that must determine the issue.
What, then, is the meaning of the words “the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the member”? It has been said, and said truly, that the phrase is derived from the constitutional understandings that support the unwritten, or rather partly unwritten, Constitution of the United Kingdom. It recognises the basic assumption of that Constitution, as it has been developed, that, so long ” the elected House of Representatives is in being, a majority of its members who are prepared to act to together with some cohesion is entitled to determine the effective leadership of the Government of the day. It recognises also one other principle that has come to be accepted in the United Kingdom: that, subject to questions as to the right of dissolution and appeal to the electorate, a Prime Minister ought not to remain office as such once it has been established that he has ceased to command the support of a majority of the House. But, when that is said, the practical application of these principles to a given situation if it arose in the United Kingdom, would depend less upon any simple statement of principle than upon the actual facts of that situation and the good sense and political sensitivity of the main actors called upon to take part.
It is said, too, that the ‘support’ that in to be considered is nothing else than support in the proceedings of the House itself, and with this proposition also their Lordships are in agreement. They do not think, however, that it is in itself a very pregnant observation. No doubt, everything comes back in the end to
the question what action the members of a party or a group or a combination are resolved to take in proceedings on the floor of the House; but in democratic politics speeches or writings outside the House, party meeting, speeches or activities inside the House short of actual voting are all capable of contributing evidence to indicate what action this or that member has decided to take when and if he is called upon to vote in the House, and it appears to their Lordships somewhat unreal to try to draw a firm dividing line between votes and other demonstrations where the issue of ‘support’ is concerned.
This, indeed, is the crux of the question that has now been raised. The respondent maintains, and it is implied in the decision that he has obtained from the Federal Supreme Court, that the Governor cannot constitutionally take account of anything in the matter of ‘support’ except the record of votes actually given on the floor of the House. Consequently, it is said, his action in removing the first respondent from the Premiership on the strength, it appears, of the letter address to him by the 66 members of the House referred to and without waiting until there had been an adverse vote in the House itself was not within the powers conferred upon him by the Constitution.
The difficulty of limiting the statutory power of the Governor in this way is that the limitation is not to be found in the words in which the makers of the Constitution have decided to record their description of his powers. By the words they have employed in their formula, ‘it appears to him’, the judgment as to the support enjoyed by a Premier is left to the Governors own assessment and there is no limitation as to the material on which he is to base his judgment or the contacts to which he may resort for the purpose. There would have been no difficulty at all in so limiting him if it had been intended to do no. For instance, he might have been given power to act only after the passing of a resolution of the House ‘that it has no confidence in the Government of the Region’, the very phrase employed in an adjoining section of the Constitution (see s. 31 (4), proviso (b) ) to delimit the Governor’s power of dissolving the House even without the Premier’s advice. According to any ordinary rule of construction weight must be given to the fact that the Governor’s power of removal is not limited in such precise terms as would confine his judgment to the actual proceedings of the House, unless there are compulsive reasons, to be found in the context of the Constitution or to be deduced from obvious general principles, that would impose the more limited meaning for which the respondent contends.
Their Lordships have not discovered any such reasons. It is one thing to point out the dangers of a Governor arriving at any conclusion “to his Premier”s support in the House except upon the incontrovertible evidence of votes recorded there on some crucial issue. There are indeed such danger Expressions of opinion, attitude or intention upon such a delicate matter may well prove to be delusive. He may Judge the situation wrongly and so find himself to have taken a critical step in a direction which is proved to be contrary to the wishes of the majority of the House or of the electorate. Again, if he is not to rely an his Premier for advice as to the balance of support in the House, he is likely to And that he is in effect consulting indirectly the views of opposition leaders who may turn out
in the event to be no more than an opposition: or he will find himself backing the political judgments conveyed to him by his own private advisers against the political judgment of the Premier himself
All these are real dangers which any Governor proposing to act under his power of removal would need to bear in mind, since, if he ignores them, he would run the risk of placing the constitutional sovereign power, whose representative he in, in conflict with the will of the elected House of Representatives whose majority is for the time being expressed in the person of the Premier. Anyone familiar with the constitutional history and development of the United Kingdom would naturally dwell upon these aspects of the Sovereign’s position, if he was invited to advise a Governor as to the circumstances and occasions upon which he could wisely exercise his power of removal.
But, while there may be formidable arguments in favour of the Governor confining his conclusion on such a point to the recorded voting in the House, if the impartiality of the constitutional sovereign in not to be in danger of compromise, the arguments are considerations of policy and propriety which it in for him to weigh on each particular occasion: they are not legal restrictions which a Court of law, interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution, can import into the written document and make it his legal duty to observe. To sum up, there are many food arguments to discourage a Governor from exercising his power of removal except upon indisputable evidence of actual voting in the House, but it is nonetheless impossible to say that situations cannot arise in which these arguments are outweighed by considerations which afford-to the Governor the evidence he is to look for, even without the testimony of recorded votes.
Another argument has been advanced to the effect that the Nigerian Constitutions are modelled on the current constitutional doctrines of the United Kingdom, and, since the British Sovereign would not be regarded as acting with constitutional propriety in dismissing a Prime Minister from office without the foundation of an adverse vote on a major issue in the House of Commons, so the Governor in Western Nigeria must similarly be treated as precluded from exercising his power of removal in the absence of a vote of the awe kind. This approach to the matter appears to their Lordships to have had some influence upon the view taken by the majority of the Federal Supreme Court in this case, and, since it seems capable of conveying an implication that could be misleading in other situations apart from the present one, their Lordships wish to make two observations upon it.
The first is that British constitutional history does not offer any but a general negative guide as to the circumstances in which a Sovereign can dismiss a Prime Minister. Since the principles which are accepted today began to take shape with the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832 no British Sovereign has in fact dismissed or removed a Prime Minister, even allowing for the ambiguous exchanges which took place between William IV and Lord Melbourne in 1834. Discussion of constitutional doctrine bearing upon a Prime Minister’s loss of support in the House of Commons concentrates therefore upon a Prime Minister’s duty to ask for liberty to resign or for a dissolution, rather than upon the Sovereign’s right of removal, an exercise of which is not treated as being within the scope of
practical politics. In this state of affairs it is vain to look to British precedent for guidance upon the circumstances in which or the evidential material upon which a Prime Minister can be dismissed, where dismissal is an actual possibility: and the right or removal which is explicitly recognised in the Nigerian Constitutions must be interpreted according to the wording of its own limitations and not to limitations which that wording does not import.
. … it is in the end the wording of the Constitution itself that is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording can never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions which are not explicitly incorporated in the formulae that have been chosen as the frame of this Constitution.”
In my view the Privy Council’s judgment relating to the Constitution of Nigeria does not apply to the Constitution of Sarawak because of the following distinguishing features and circumstances:
(1) In the Nigerian case it was mathematically beyond question that more than half the House no longer supported the Premier.
(2) The measurement in Nigeria was a measurement of “support”, not of “confidence”. The Sarawak Constitution is dated subsequent to the decision of Adegbenro v. Akintola, and it does seem to me that the “confidence” of a majority of members, being a term of art, may imply reference to a vote such as a vote of confidence or a vote on a major issue.
(3) In Nigeria it was not disputed that the Governor had express power to remove the Premier from office if he no longer commanded support.
(4) In Nigeria the Governor had express power to assess the situation “as it appeared to him”.
(5) In Nigeria all Ministers, including the Premier, held office “during the Governor’s pleasure”; although there was an important proviso to this.
All the above five points were peculiar to Nigeria, and not one of them applies to Sarawak. These distinguishing features force me in the present case to a conclusion converse to the Privy Council decision. It seems to me that by the provisions of the Sarawak Constitution, lack of confidence may be demonstrated only by a vote in Council Negri. Men who put their names to a “Top Secret” letter may well hesitate to vote publicly in support of their private views.
The third of the five points listed above obviously requires further consideration. Has the Governor in Sarawak power at all to dismiss the Chief Minister? In considering this question, we may start with s. 21 of the Interpretation Ordinance, the general effect of which is that where there is power to appoint (and it is not disputed that the Governor has power to appoint a Chief Minister) there is power to dismiss. However, where the appointment is “subject to the approval …. of some other person the power of dismissal shall only be exercisable…. subject to the approval….of such other person.” If the appointment of a Chief Minister is subject to the approval of Council Negri, then by this s. 21 dismissal also would be subject to its approval. Further, in principle, Council Negri should manage its own affairs. A Governor is limited by article 6(3) of the Constitution to appointing as Chief Minister a member of Council Negri who in his judgment is likely to command its confidence (and approval) : thereafter it follows, by s. 21 of the Interpretation Ordinance, that only when Council Negri has shown lack of confidence (and lack of approval), can the Governor’s power to dismiss, if it exists, be exercised.
Of course, if the Sarawak Constitution lays down that a Chief Minister may not be dismissed at all, then the defendants have no case and the Interpretation Ordinance cannot apply. The Sarawak Constitution does in fact direct in article 7(3) that all Ministers other than the Chief Minister hold office at the Governor’s pleasure. According to Mr. Le Quesne this means that Ministers other than the Chief Minister may be dismissed “at the Governor’s pleasure”, whereas the Chief Minister may only be dismissed for cause. If the cause for dismissal is limited to the case of an adverse vote, then this interpretation does not help defendants. In my view, however, the suggested interpretation is altogether false. Article 7(3) clearly means that the Governor may dismiss Ministers but may not dismiss the Chief Minister in any circumstances.
A lot has been said about the duty and powers and discretion of the Governor. His paramount duty is to “act in accordance with the advice of the Supreme Council or of a member thereof acting under the general authority of the Council”. (Article 10(1). There are two occasions when the Governor has a discretion, that is, when he can act without, or even contrary to, the advice of the Supreme Council. Those occasions are in the performance of the following functions –
(a) the appointment of a Chief Minister;
(b) the withholding of consent to a request for the dissolution of the Council Negri. (Article 10 (2) ).
As regards (a), nobody could be so foolish as to suggest that a Governor could appoint a second Chief Minister while there was still one in office. As regards (b), this probably has in mind a situation of splinter parties, as has been the case in France, when a general election could not be expected to show an overall majority for any one party. In Sarawak, it seems to me that a Chief Minister may advise a dissolution, even though he has not as yet lost the confidence of Council Negri. In such circumstances, the Governor’s refusal to dissolve might be conventionally unconstitutional, although not illegal.
To revert to the comparison of the Constitutions of Sarawak and of Nigeria, these Constitutions are so different that a contrast in powers must be intended: in Sarawak the Chief Minister’s dismissal is quite simply beyond the powers of the Governor.
If the Constitution, however, should be construed as giving to the Governor a power to dismiss, that power can only be exercised – and I think that this was conceded by Mr. Le Quesne – when both
(a) the Chief Minister has lost the confidence of the House, and
(b) the Chief Minister has refused to resign and failed to advise a dissolution.
I have already dealt with (a) ; as regards (b), I do not think that the Chief Minister of Sarawak was ever given a reasonable opportunity to tender his resignation or to request a dissolution. He was never even shown the letter on which the dismissal was based until Court proceedings started, although it is true that at the moment of dismissal a list of signatories was sent to him with the letter from the Governor dated 17 June that list and that letter were typed on the same date as the publication in the Gazette of the dismissal of the plaintiff, who was given no time at all to consider the weight or effect of the move against him. Plaintiff did not refuse to resign: he merely expressed doubts whether in fact he had ceased to command a majority and requested “that the matter be put to the constitutional test”.
A word may be said on what is the position if a Chief Minister has in fact ceased to command the confidence of a majority, and yet refuses to resign. In this situation at least, Mr. Le Quesne claims that the Governor must have a right of dismissal; otherwise the Constitution would be unworkable. Mr. Le Quesne’s argument in effect is: if there is a gap, it must be filled: if there is no express power to enforce the resignation of a Chief Minister, that power must by implication lie with the Governor. I do not agree that stopgaps can be, as it were, improvised. In article 1 of the Constitution, a gap would appear to exist whenever the necessary address to remove the Governor is made to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, and the latter’y refuses to dismiss him. Just because a Chief Minister or a Governor does not go when he ought to go is not sufficient reason for implying in the Constitution an enforcing power vested in some individual. R is, however, reasonable that in certain situations the Courts could expound the Constitution by declaratory judgments. Articles or clauses to cover all situations need not be set out in a Constitution because the residue of discretionary power is left in the Courts. Extraordinary situations do not often arise, and need not be met or considered until they do. Dicey has a whole chapter on “The Sanction by which the Conventions of the Constitution are enforced”. (Chapter XV: The law of the Constitution: AV Dicey (10th Edn.) pp 444 to 457.)
….the nation expects that a Minister who cannot retain the confidence of the House of Commons, shall give up his place, and no Premier even dreams of disappointing these expectations.” (at p. 444)
But the sanction which constrains the boldest political adventurer to obey the fundamental principles of the constitution and the conventions in which these principles are expressed, is the fact that the breach of principles and of these conventions will almost immediately bring the offender into conflict with the Courts and the law of the land.” (at p. 445)
. .. the one essential principle of the constitution is obedience by all persons to the deliberately expressed will of the House of Commons in the first instance, and ultimately to the will of the nation as expressed through Parliament.” (at p. 456)
Of course, therefore, a Minister or a Ministry must resign if the House passes a vote of want of confidence.”
(at p. 457)
Dicey is speaking of the British Constitution, but the same principles apply mutatis mutandis to the Constitution of Sarawak. The constitutional way out both for a British Prime Minister and for a Sarawak Chief Minister is not by dismissal but by resignation. We need not speculate on what would happen if occasion arose for a resignation, and a Chief Minister refused to resign. ‘In the instant case, the Chief Minister has not refused to resign, and there is no power to dismiss him. He has already indicated through his Counsel that he was prepared to consider a dissolution and presently an election. That political solution may well be the only way to avoid a multiplicity of legal complications. Possibly all parties, and the people of this nation, in whom sovereignty is supposed to lie, will wish the same solution.
In some political situations a judicial duty to rule upon the legal merits of the case may have to be accepted as an inescapable obligation …. In an atmosphere highly charged with political tension the task of the Judges may be acutely embarrassing, especially if they are called upon to decide between two claimants to legitimate political power, of whom one commands the effective means of imposing his will and the other is able to marshal equally or more persuasive legal arguments.”
(“The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions”:
SA de Smith, p. 87)
Embarrassing as it may be, my task is simply to interpret the written word of the Constitution. On such interpretation the case presented in the statement of claim is unchallengeable. There will be judgment for the plaintiff as prayed.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
” Malaysia is in such a deplorable place NOT because of EVIL umNO / BN but because you and I the eligible voters did not cast your votes ” . Now by just mere casting your vote is NOT ( NEVER ) enough..we are more knowledgable and cultured than before. We need to get more voters ( VOTER GET VOTERS ),keep them well informed. Who they vote is non of our business but encourage them to vote for a goverment who is hell bend on eradicating corruptions,abses of human rights, separation of powers,revamp the entire goverment machinery esp the judiaciary, EC, PDRM . Vote for a FREE BETTER Malaysia.
VOTER GET VOTERS…Not Tomorrow but NOW or its NEVER
SunShine1,,
Without a Doubt.
Dear Friends…,
Just to share my novice piece in writing..
My name is Rustam of Alam Shah..,
and if you google my name…,
you will find my so naive pieces of writing..
I am a die hard supporter for DSAI…
and I will fighting to the ends…
Yesterweek…,
Someone share with me… she from Dubai..
Pardon me if I may be much comfortable to write in Bahasa Melayu..
” .. menurut beliau, bangsa Melayu adalah salah satu bangsa yang tidak suka kepada peperangan.
Bangsa Melayu akan terus L A Y U kerana sifat Melayu yg layu…
Jika anda membuat onar atau sesuatu yg amat buruk.., percayalah Bangsa Melayu yg paling mudah akan memaafkan dan L U P A dan L A Y U … lagi..
dan lagi L U P A…
so… bangsa Melayu akan terus dalam “Buridan’s Ass” atau maksud nya
“…is an illustration of a paradox in philosophy in the conception of free will…. ”
Percaya lah…
jika Media Massa Malaysia di bawah Si Dajjal UMNO…
sifatnya….
UMNO akan terus membakar semangat keTUANan Melayu..,
maka terbentuklah seperti satu algae
“.. ranging from unicellular to multicellular forms…”
akan bersatu kembali..
Itu yang British telah “easily establish the core” kelemahan bangsa Melayu..
terlalu mudah utk disatukan.. walau jutaan dosa UMNO telah lakukan…
sometimes.. I am not proud to be Bangsa Melayu…
dan kerana itu.. saya akan belajar lebih baik dan membuktikan saya bukan seorang bangsa M E L A Y U dan terus L A Y U ……
Percayalah PKR atau PAS akan gagal kerana bangsa Melayu di dalam nya..
Now… I hope I will support more to moderate Islamic approach as Malaysia is a secular countries as mentioned by Tunku Abdul Rahman
UMNO adalah satu bangsa Dajjal Melayu yang ditakdirkan di dalam masyarakat Melayu..
Biarkan Luncai Terjun dengan Labu Labu nya..
Biarkan … Biarkan…..
Biarkan M E L A Y U dengan asyik dengan KeTUANan Melayu..nya..
Biarkan … Biarkan…..
Kita benar-benar dalam situasi Hobson’s Choice…
apa lagi… Morton’s Fork … “between the devil and the deep blue sea” or “between a rock and a hard place.”
Bersatulah SATU Malaysia…
Ayuh kita J A H A N A M kan … UMNO…
Wassalam
Assalamualaikum..
Rustam Affendi bin Abu Rahim
SRK Si Rusa, Port Dickson (1979-1983)
SRK Cator Avenue, Ipoh (1984)
Sek Alam Shah, Cheras (1985-1989)
Uni Utara Malaysia (1990-1997)
Uni Ballarat AMI Melbourne (2009-2011)
Rustam,
This shame from Dubai must have benifited the most during the perod of DEB.
After getting all the benefit from it, SHE MUDAH LUPA.
She should be thankful and suppose to give back to the society but SHE is only able to BITE back.
Of course her genetic suddenly transformed into something else….that I am unable to identify which group of species SHE belongs.
As other races in the world, all of them has their own great history and civiliasation whether cultural,economic,social and religion.They all were great in their own world.
It is unbecoming and uncivilised (badly raise) to call the MALAY a backward race or branding it as dajjal.
I believe SHE from DUBAI has genetically transformed into DAJJAL.
With the precedent being established by the court ruling, we must now accept that elected politicians serve on the pleasure of the royalty and run the country as such. Can UMNO do that?
I am sure the royal palaces in all states are ready to exercise their new found powers to govern the country.
Democracy and principles of constitutional law wasn’t killed by the decision of the Federal Court in the Perak Crisis. It died when the right to appeal to the Privy Council was abolished!!
“Looks like the monarchy wants UMNO to rule so as to ensure their own survival. They fear the Opposition.” Sam01.
There appears to be more than an element of truth in that statement, bolstered by UMNO’s manipulation and appointment of Zaki as CJ , renewal of the IGP’s contract (in the face of massive public opposition) and the Perak coup, all with the consent of the King and the Sultans.
But when I think of 1776, 1789, the fall of apartheid and a hundred other historic dates, there’s no way 5 judges anywhere can permanently stem the tide of history! No way!!
dpp
We are all of 1 race, the Human Race
Today I say the court is no good, the judges are no good,the AG’s are no good, but early tommorow morning I am the oNE who will be the first to rush and file cases by cases in the court to seek justice.
Today I say that I don’t trust the security force, but tomorow I will ask the same security force to safeguard me.
What is wrong to me today is not wrong tomorrow and vice versa.
What is wrong with me?
Pelangisenja
There is nothing wrong with you. It is just that there are no options for you when you seek legal recourse. Like it or not that is the only court that we have and can use
Hobson`s Choice
pelangijustpagi & guys,
,,,just most unfortunately, we malaysians are just a confused lot from the very just first day !. We just say one thing and yet just does another. We say just yes but in fact its just a no !. At times a no for a yes to be adjust !.
,,,when can we just all get our just act together ?. Guess even calling God gets just confused !. Playing just politics with Him God Almighty too….lagi nak adjust adjust ?.
,,,eeermmm, just good night but why selamat malam ?….malam bagus-pun tak teradjust !.
,,,challenging times just being malaysians indeed is just not right/wrong now.
,,,who to judge, when the judges need to be judged for being unjudged. Just in 1Malaysia as we are little judged as some just ?.
,,,Can we not just adjust the unjudged ?.
,,,sorry, just yaa !…but should we end up being our own judge.?. yaa !
Dear pelangisenja,
Matter of end root game…?, ” mahu pun tak bolih.., tak mau pun tak bolih ” Do you take this country as sick..?
Or You, me and the rest are so. (SICK )
We are not Sick………, we are just plain Bloody Sick.
Take care……,
Care to define in your own term’s Freedom,
Dr.Rafick, Capt and pelangisenja,
This feeling is mine and mine alone….., our Judiciary is Shit….., how can it not be…? Your guees is as good as mine.
Our so call MORON’S that we call EX., appoints them with the blessing of our so call Royalty……, Bro….,
apa u cakap..? Tak ada kita ini semua tau kulum saja.
Coming back to the real affair’s have we not gone wrong…some where along the line….., just like the scumbags…entitled…to do the check and balancing…., untill they sell their souls to the DEVIL…., for some ten quantified years of joy on this earth before they ROT in HELL. ( MOST Of THE TIME LIKE AUGUST…, THEY MEET JUNE FIRST )
Just who started the grand frog jumping story? Wasn’t it Anwar Ibrahim……? Serve them right ! LOL Padan muka !
Dear Yopsendiri,
Anwar never started the Frog jumping….., since he was new ….., he just wanted to make sure the Jetty could accomodate…..the Frog’s and the tadpoles. ( All over P.M. )
Yop…., please send your resume….., to scrutinize…., for you could be the next…….Paper Doll.
The Rakyat lost when Razaleigh lost the UMNO presidency many years ago. Then the royalties and the judiciaries and then the other institutions just follow.
Now just be prepared for such hilarious laughters such as that picture shows!
yeah agreed…from now on we call them not wakil rakyat but wakil sultan or wakil najib or wakil projek or wakil underworlds or wakil komisen or wakil federal court and last but not least wakil penyapu buruk!…….guys let’s put our jungle gear and not waste our time.let’s go for the BIG ONE…the GE13!!!insyaAllah Allah shall be with us.
soul saviour,
Of course in the rulers court they are address as MEMANDA.
If you observe rightly it is an ‘ expansion version of power ‘ from the palace to the wakil rakyat (ambassador) to execute and monitor the wellbeing of the rakyat.
It is my understanding as a layman of constitutional monarchy.
Dato’ Seri Nizar,Dato’TGNA,Dato’ Seri TGHA (all this tittle has some status and protocol) in the rulers court.
* stand to be corrected *
Do you think they care?
They are about to be thrown out of office, so, it’s irrelevant to them whether democracy is compromised or not.
They will drain the country of it’s resources and then migrate to another country with their loot leaving the ordinary people to suffer the consequences.
The judges must be hauled up for sedition for deliberate acts of terrorism against the democracy of the state of Perak and the nation!
The impact of these idiotic judges acts of betrayal is far worse than any communist terrorist could hope to achieve!
These judges must now be labelled as terrorists against the nation for wilfully murdering the democratic rights of all Malaysians!!
Why do we still need SPR… no need lah as we can save much more by closing down SPR ….. let the King or Sultan elect who they want as our ADUN or MP…
Therefore they should not be known as Wakil Rakyat but Wakil Sultan….. hahaha
It was not the operation of the law which made Zambry winning the case but the victory was donated by the 5 presiding judges to Najib. I believe any lawyer who thinks as a lawyer should be, can tell us that legally, the judgment was/is and shall be flawed. I am patiently waiting for N.H. Chan’s comments.
Doc,
The highest court had decided . Argue all you want will make no difference as the ruling has set a precedent. Wrong as it may, what it means is HRH the Sultan of Perak has the authority under the state constitutional monarchy to act. The decision has strenghtened the power of the Sultan. I therefore disagree with you that the second loser is the Perak Royalty and the system of monarchy in Malaysia. It is pure conjecture out of your disappointment to say the rakyat wants the royalty out.
I agree with you though that the biggest loser is the rakyat of Perak. The Perakians have to blame the frogging politicians. It is high time that the anti hopping law be legislated making it a law that a YB must resign and cannot change party or move to become an independent after being elected. It is not fair to the electorates who have voted .
Dear AK
The last I checked, HRH has no power to remove MB but only to consent one appointment
drrafick
Doc,
It is not what we say that matters. My simple understanding is same with you but then the learned 5 federal court judges can twist and turn all kind of submissions/ legal argumenst and come up with their own interpretation of the law.
As I see it, the precedent set in the decision is what that matters. So , HRH the Sultan of Perak is “KING” under the Perak State Constitutional Law. Period.
Dr. Rafick / AK & pelangisenja,
Can these Joker’s Sleep at night….., I cannot…., might be need to do more write ups.
AK,
I agree with your first para.
The Perakians have to blame the frogging politicians?
1. All politician have this frogging DNA not only the elected but also the elector. Today they cast their vote to this fella and tomorrow to that fella.Aren’t this called frogging?
2. Today they are in this party and tomorrow in another party.Aren’t this call frogging?
3. Who “nurtured ” the early frog in Perak?. Why don’t anyone talk about the person who nurtured and flag off the frog race in Perak?
4. Is it fair the loser become human, the winner becomes the frog?
5. Who is the father of all frogs?
Pelangisenja ,
I am not into the blaming game. As I see it both sides of the political divide are wrong. We, the rakyat are caught in between in their quest for power. Collateral damage to them politicians.
Pelangi senja
(1) Frogging – which is in the genetic of every immoral politicians
(2) Abuses and not following due process which is what is of greater concern in Perak
Dear pelangisenja,
TOYOL The JAWA started this not DSAI.
They were then call ” TEMPIK “…., later the chinese in BN Call them ” FROG “……, then you knowlah melayu dan indiah…..riuh se kampong panggil nama ” KATAK ”
Kebetulan lahir tiga KATAK di PERAK , satu Cina, Satu Mamak dan satu mamak kacuk campur melayu.
Balasi,
ha!ha!ha!
5-0 from the judges. They don’t even want to give an impression of fairness like 4-1 or 3-2. Clearly BN does not know how to go through the motion to soften the blow. Their arrogance has made them lost touch with the people.
wonder how much of tax payer monies go into getting the unanimous votes?
UMNO memiliki 28 kerusi secara bersendirian di Perak, adakah mana-mana parti yang memenangi majoriti sebanyak ini di Perak? tidak perlulah campur sana, campur sini untuk mencukupkan angka matematik untuk mengatakan majoriti meyebelahi kamu, lihatlah hakikat parti mana sebenarnya mempunyai majoriti mutlak secara bersendirian di Perak. UMNO lah satu-satunya parti yang mempunyai majoriti mutlak dan di pilih oleh rakyak Perak.
Doc,
Kalau masih belum lupa lagi perbincangan kita sebelum Pilihanraya ke-12 dimana saya dengan yakin mengatakan BN akan kehilangan majoriti 2/3, doc katakan saya bermimpi di siang hari, begitu juga dengan RPK semasa di ceramah-ceramah beliau tidak yakin BN akan kehilangan majoriti 2/3, cukup sekadar mengurangkan majoriti. Di Bagan Pinang pula saya mengatakan BN akan menang besar tetapi doc kata peluang 50-50. Nampaknya dah 2-0 ni Doc. Di mana silapnya ramalan Doc?Silapnya di atas analisis yang tidak mencakup realiti keseluruhan sehingga ke akar umbi. Saya harap Doc simpan ramalan saya yang ke-3 ini untuk rujukan di masa hadapan. Ramalan saya BN akan mendapat semula majoriti 2/3 mereka dalam Pilihanraya ke-13.
Kush
I dont remember that we had the above said discussion..
Kalau Doc ada simpan e-mail dalam archive, cuba check e-mail bertarikh 03/07/2008 04:59 PM , di situ juga saya menggunakan perkataaan “Tsunami” yang saya jangka akan berlaku. Saya juga mengatakan apa yang tidak pernah berlaku sepanjang 50 tahun bakal berlaku.
can you forward that email and my response to that email as well . Please send to drrafick@gmail.com
Dear Dr. Rafick,
Can you produce this so call KUSH e-mail for all of us to digest.
Food for Thought……, we need guy’s like this to hold the lamp.
first the facts, UMNO won the seat under BN. and BN has 28 seats. There is no such thing as since you have the biggest amount of seats, you have the right to govern. you need to have a MAJORITY and a party or coalition that can show they have the majority support, can form the govt. but we know there are 2 standards, one for UMNO and for the rest of us like the case in Sabah during the or look at kelantan in 1977, who had the most seat and who had the majority
Dear Kush,
Minta izin, can you reproduce the e mail that you sent to Dr. Let us digest it.
Thanks Bro.
The court ruling was a BIG disappointment and unjust in the eyes of the rakyat.
On the next election, let the Ruler/Court decide, no point having a GE as our votes seems utterly oblivious and void.
So tomorrow 115 MPs can quietly walk into the King’s palace and prove to him that they have lost confidence in Najib and they want Tunku Razaleigh as PM and bingo Najib is ousted and we have Tunku Razaleiigh as the new PM.
This is Malaysian democracy and the world can learn from us. Or is it the Malaysian version of Dawn Raid.
Doc, what you heard in the coffee shop is real. People are talking about it everywhere.
Looks like the monarchy wants UMNO to rule so as to ensure their own survival. They fear the Opposition.
Dear Sam01,
They will not demand as what you wrote……, they will demand that the MAMAK is appointed a Senator…., and he be named the PM….., second time licking his balls or I would say scratching it like my Dog.
This country is heading towards a very dangerous trend with warlords wanting their ways. The court may end up just being a rubber stamp for those in power. With that we can sing the death of democracy as those warlords would want to practice their skills in everything from business to rent seeking to even selective persecution if and when needed.
We need those educated and enlightened Malays to rise up and be voted into Parliament to make the necessary change for the future of this nation. Only with righteous rule will there be blessing from God for the nation. The poor and needy must have a place in our society and must not be neglected by those in power.
Dr.,
Again , do you think they give a damn about what you have to say as long as they
win control of the State !!
Looks like your blog header will remain in Black for a long long time…. maybe until you
run , and win as an Independent .
I again quote Albert Einstein ……
” the world is a dangerous place not
because of the evil some people do but
because of the others who LOOK ON
and do NOTHING ”
You can have the opportunity to tell your
son that you may not give him the RM5000
but you will be serving the People , and
he will grow up to realise the RM5000 will
pale into insignificance.
I believe the score is 3-0 for year 2010.
Game over !
Salam
jtba
jtba,
What made you think Dr Raffick’s blog header’s colour will be changed if he runs and wins as an independent in the next election?
Not yet!! Winning as an independent does not guarantee democracy is restored . Individual effort is not strong enough, you serve only one constituency, not the country!!
Please read MT ‘OK, let us move on now ‘ by RPK, PR needs capable and efficient candidates to run the country. join them and be part of the team, Dr!!
Dear Jtba
Again, you win .. score is 3-0 in your favor.. I must stop this losing streak
jtba,
do you think that ONLY the politician can do CHANGE ?
Dear pelangisenja,
You got it right….., what are we in this Blog up to….., if it’s not for ” CHANGE “